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"Sharing" is the concept that defines marital property in
community property states.' It means that property acquired during
marriage is presumed to be community property unless proved
2
otherwise. It means that the earnings of either spouse are owned
by the community, not the working spouse. It also means
management and control of community property is shared. Many
couples do not even consider the community property
ramifications of marriage. Marriage means opting in to the
community property system, for better or worse. But, for some
couples, community property concepts do not match their view of
their financial life together. For those couples, there are many ways
of opting out of the community property system even if sharing is
legislatively mandated in community property states. Those ways
of asserting their autonomy within their relationship may garner
various degrees of success.
Why would some couples want to opt out? Mainly, it reflects a
different view of marriage than that adopted in community
property states. They have grown up with the idea of autonomy-
the ability to be independent and make independent decisions
about their lives. Imagine a couple considering marriage and each
has a professional career. They value their work and view their
earnings and success as a product of their hard work. If they marry,
they want to retain the right to own and manage those earnings
Copyright 2011, by CHARLOTTE K. GOLDBERG.
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, B.A. Connecticut
College, 1966, J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1978.
1. For example, the California Family Code defines "community property"
as "all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married
person during the marriage while domiciled in this state." CAL. FAM. CODE §
760 (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011 amendments).
2. Statham v. Statham, 986 So. 2d 894, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2008) ("Things
in the possession of a spouse during the existence of a regime of community of
acquets and gains are presumed to be community, but either spouse may prove
that they are separate property" (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2340 (2009))).
3. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102(a) (West, Westlaw current through Jan.
2011 amendments) ("[E]ither spouse has the management and control of the
community real property ... but both spouses . . . must join in executing any
instrument by which that community real property or any interest therein is
leased for a longer period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered.").
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independently. In addition, they may have run the numbers and
found that, because of the so-called "marriage penalty," marriage
is not a tax advantage.4 Another couple may be considering a
second marriage after having had a bitter and divisive battle over
community property in their first marriages. They now understand
the difference between community property and separate property
and prefer that their earnings be considered separate property.
Also, they may want to protect those earnings as an inheritance for
their children from a prior marriage. Another couple may be
considering marriage where one is considered "economically
superior." That person may be concerned that his/her prospective
spouse is more interested in that person's wealth rather than his/her
other sterling character traits. Even though all community property
states consider property owned before marriage as separate
property,5 the economically superior spouse may want that
understanding spelled out, and would especially want an explicit
separation of property agreement concerning earnings during
marriage. Another couple just may not be able to accept the
principle of sharing. The following stereotypes come to mind: the
wife staying at home, eating bonbons, and reading romance novels,
or the husband staying at home, drinking beer, and watching sports
on TV. For some, those stereotypes conjure up the image of the
"at-home" spouse reaping the benefits of the "working spouse's"
efforts. Therefore, in all these scenarios, those couples may
consider opting out of the community property system of sharing.
This article examines various options for couples who opt in or
opt out of the community property system. These options may be
informal or formal, by inaction or by action. Particular attention
will be given to the community property systems in California,
Louisiana, and Washington.6 The discussion is divided into three
sections. The first section examines the decision to marry or not to
marry. Some couples may think an informal, marital-like
4. The "marriage penalty" is:
The difference between the greater income-tax liability owed by a
married couple filing a joint income-tax return and the lesser amount
they would owe had they been single and filed individually. A marriage
penalty exists whenever a married couple is treated disadvantageously
under a tax code in comparison with an unmarried couple.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1062-63 (9th ed. 2009).
5. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a) (West, Westlaw current through Jan.
2011 amendments) ("Separate property of a married person includes all of the
following: (1) All property owned by the person before marriage. (2) All
property acquired by the person after marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent ..... ).
6. The other traditional community property states are Arizona, Idaho,
Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas.
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relationship will eventually ripen into common law marriage.
Some couples may think that having an informal marital-like
relationship will allow them to escape the community property
regime. The second section addresses the possibility of opting out
of the community property system even if a couple decides to
marry. This section will focus mainly on premarital agreements as
an alternative. All community property states allow couples to
formally opt out of the community property system through a
written premarital agreement.7 An issue does arise, however, of
whether a premarital agreement could be effective if it is informal
and not committed to paper. The third section deals with opting out
of the community property system during marriage. In most
marriages, couples arrange their financial affairs in the most
informal ways without regard to requirements under community
property laws. Sometimes couples find that their informal
arrangements are not recognized by community property doctrine.
Especially as a marriage ends, the couple discovers their informal
arrangements do not match the formal requirements of community
property law.
I. How TO OPT IN, OPT OUT: Do THE OPTIONS REALLY WORK?
A. Option #1: Don't Get Married
1. Common-law Marriage
Some couples drift into a relationship and later begin living
together. They may have various reasons for making that decision.
One reason is they want to test their relationship to see if it can
grow into something more permanent.8 It also might make
financial sense to live together if they are spending a lot of time
together at one person's apartment. At that point, they would
probably keep most of their finances separate but may share certain
household expenses. If they are acquainted with the community
property system, they may think living together will be a way to
avoid the sharing principles mandated by the community property
system. In most community property states, they are correct. Even
7. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1611 (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments) ("A premarital agreement shall be in writing and signed by both
parties.").
8. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) ("We are aware that
many young couples live together without the solemnization of marriage, in
order to make sure that they can successfully later undertake marriage.").
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if the relationship lasts for a long period of time, no shared
property rights would arise from the relationship.
On the other hand, many couples have the impression that if
they live together for a long enough period of time, they have
opted in to the community property system via common-law
marriage.9 In the past, it may have been possible for one cohabitant
to try to prove that their relationship was a common-law marriage
even though they had not formally married. That route of opting in
is extremely difficult today. All community property states have
abolished common-law marriage except Texas. Idaho was the most
recent to abolish common-law marriage; as of January 1, 1996,
"[m]arriage created by a mutual assumption of marital duties, or
obligations shall not be recognized as a lawful marriage."'o Texas
still recognizes what are called "informal marriages," but it is not
easy to rove the elements giving rise to a common-law
marriage.' Therefore, in most community property states, living
together without ever marrying may be an effective way of opting
out of the community property system.
9. Many people think they have a common-law marriage after living
together for seven years. See Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Schemes of
Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of Common Law Marriage, 13 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483, 484 n.2 (2007).
10. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-201 (West, Westlaw current through Jul. 2011).
The other community property states prohibited common law marriage at an
earlier date: the state of Louisiana never recognized common law marriages (La.
Digest of 1808 bk. I, tit. IV, Ch. II, art. 4); Washington abolished them in 1892
(In re MacLaughlin's Estate, 30 P. 651 (Wash. 1892)); followed by California in
1895 (CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments) (formerly CAL. FAM. CODE § 55 (1872)); New Mexico in 1905 (N.
M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-20 (West, Westlaw current through Mar. 2011
amendments)); Arizona in 1913 (ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-111 (West, Westlaw
current through Apr. 2011 amendments)); and Nevada in 1943 (NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 122.010 (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011 amendments)).
11. The Texas statute provides that "the marriage of a man and woman may
be proved by evidence that . . . the man and woman agreed to be married and
after the agreement they lived together in this state as husband and wife and
there represented to others that they were married." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
2.401(a) (West, Westlaw current through May 2011 amendments). See also,
Kathryn S. Vaughn, The Recent Changes to the Texas Informal Marriage
Statute: Limitation or Abolition of Common-Law Marriage?, 28 HOUs. L. REV.
1131, 1150 (1991) ("Although Texas officially recognizes common-law
marriages, it does so rather grudgingly."); see e.g., Smith v. Deneve, 285
S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. App. 2009) (failure to prove essential element of
"holding out" as married).
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2. Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants
However, cohabitants sometimes learn that long-term, marital-
like relationships yield shared property rights. The most well-
known case establishing that unmarried cohabitants may have a
right to shared proerty is the California Supreme Court case of
Marvin v. Marvin.' The Marvin Court held unmarried cohabitants
may contract either in writing, orally, or through conduct to share
property.' 3 It is rare that cohabitants have a written agreement. It is
difficult to establish an oral contract when there is a battle between
the two cohabitants over who said what.14 Yet, it is possible that a
court will find an implied-in-fact contract where there has been a
long-term relationship and the cohabitants' financial or business
conduct demonstrates an agreement to share property." The
underlying reasoning behind giving long-term cohabitants shared
property rights is two-fold. First, the court recognized that even
though a couple is living together, they still have the right to
contract with each other regarding property.16 Second, the court
recognized that an inequity can arise where one cohabitant
produced all the earnings and the other cohabitant had none. 17 I
the scenario that resembles a traditional marriage with the husband
earning and the wife staying at home and caring for children, if the
relationship ends, the husband could walk away with all the
12. 557 P.2d at 122.
13. Id.
14. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the plaintiff Michelle
Marvin was not able to prove that she had an agreement with Lee Marvin to
share equally in the property accumulated during their cohabitation. Marvin v.
Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
15. In Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986),
the Court of Appeal found an implied-in-fact agreement to share property where
the couple had a long-term relationship and had pooled their finances to
purchase property. See also, Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998).
16. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116 ("[W]e base our opinion on the principle that
adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are
nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their
earnings and property rights.").
17. Id. at 121 ("[A]lthough parties to a nonmarital relationship obviously
cannot have based any expectations upon the belief that they were married, other
expectations and equitable considerations remain. The parties may well expect
that property will be divided in accord with the parties' own tacit understanding
and that in the absence of such understanding the courts will fairly apportion
property accumulated through mutual effort.").
5
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earnings because unmarried cohabitants are not subject to
community property laws.' 8
Almost all community property states have considered how to
determine cohabitants' property rights after the termination of their
relationship. Some have followed the Marvin Court's lead:
Arizona and Nevada have explicitly adopted the Marvin
approach.' 9 Texas has explicitly rejected Marvin oral and implied
agreements and has adopted by statute the requirement of a written
agreement.20 Similarly, New Mexico prohibits implied agreements
but permits express oral agreements. I Louisiana retains the term
"concubinage" to describe unmarried cohabitants and has strict
requirements to establish a share in real property.22
The courts in Washington play a strong role in determining
whether informal living arrangements represent opting in to the
sharing principles of the community property system. Washington
gives the most rights to cohabitants who can establish a
"meretricious relationship," which is defined as a "marital-like
relationship." 23 If that relationship can be established (and the
requirements are onerous), then the courts will divide property that
would have been considered community property if they had
married. Thus, unmarried cohabitants may think they are opting
out of the community property system by just living together, but
in some community property states, courts may impose a sharing
regime based on their conduct during the relationship. Thus, an
attempt to opt out of the community property system by avoiding
marriage and just living together may result in property rights that
did not match the couple's expectations or at least one of the
cohabitant's expectations.
18. See Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(couple lived together for 12 years, had 3 children together and accumulated
significant property).
19. See Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984); Western States
Construction v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220 (Nev. 1992).
20. TEX. FAM CODE ANN. § 1.108 (West, Westlaw current through May
2011 amendments); see also, Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W. 2d 822, 826 (Tex.
App. 1997) (hostility toward "palimony" suits).
21. See Merrill v. Davis, 673 P.2d 1285, 1286-87 (N.M. 1983) (recognizing
implied agreements would circumvent the prohibition of common-law
marriage); Dominguez v. Cruz, 617 P.2d 1322, 1323 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)
(express oral contract between two cohabiting adults permitted).
22. See Broadway v. Broadway, 417 So. 2d 1272, 1277 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
23. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (Wash. 2000) (To
determine if a "meretricious relationship" exists, a court must analyze five
factors: (1) continuous cohabitation, (2) duration of the relationship, (3) the
purpose of the relationship, (4) the pooling of resources and services for joint
projects, and (5) the intent of the parties.).
[Vol. 726
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In the Washington case, Lindemann v. Lindemann,24 David was
surprised to learn his auto body repair business would be
considered community property by analogy. In Lindemann, David
married Kimi in 1978, separated in 1981, and ultimately obtained a
divorce decree in 1982. In 1982, after the divorce, he started his
business. In 1985, he and Kimi began living together again but did
not remarry. When they separated again in 1995, Kimi petitioned
the court for equitable division of their property, including David's
business. It was clear David's business was separate property, and
Washington law precludes equitable distribution of separate
property acquired during a "quasi-marital" relationship.25
However, under Washington law, the increase in value attributable
to community labor could be equitably divided. David's business
had increased in value while David and Kimi had lived together
due to David's labor, and the court awarded Kimi one-half of that
increase, $109,362.75.
David's arguments on appeal indicated his frustration with
community property concepts being applied to what he clearly felt
was "his" property. First, he argued that the rule that "the marital
community is entitled to the fruits of all labor performed by either
party to the relationship" should not be applied to an unmarried
couple. The Washington Court of Appeals rejected that argument
because it would leave little remaining of the major Washington
case establishing that the property a couple earns through their
efforts during their quasi-marital relationship is to be "justly
divided."26 Second, he argued that the labor he contributed to his
business should have been viewed as "separate" labor. This
common misconception that "my" work is "mine" was also
rejected as the Court of Appeals pointed out that there is no basis
in the community property system to allocate "one party's labor to
a separate property account." 27 Both of David's arguments reflect
the view that not marrying was sufficient to opt out of the
community property system. But, the Court of Appeal corrected
this misconception. David had opted in to the sharing concept by
having a "quasi-marital" relationship-a long-term, marital-like
relationship.
Thus, opting out of the community property system by not
marrying may prove unsuccessful in many community property
24. Lindemann v. Lindemann, 960 P.2d 966 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
25. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 837 (Wash. 1995) (The court will
divide only the "property that would have been characterized as community
property had the parties been married.").
26. Lindemann, 960 P.2d at 970-71 (citing Connell, 898 P.2d at 836).
27. Id. at 971.
7
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states. Some cohabiting couples may find their expectations of
economic autonomy will be thwarted when community property
law extends its reach to unmarried couples.
B. Option #2: Let's Get Married but Opt Out by Premarital
Agreement
For those couples who want to retain their independence or
protect their wealth, premarital agreements are the surest way to
opt out of the community property sharing regime. Almost all
community property states have adopted the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act (UPAA). 28 That Act was conceived as a way of
ensuring that married couples could arrange their property rights as
they wished. The thought was that if a couple spelled out their
rights clearly in writing before marriage, there would be less
litigation upon divorce. To achieve that certainty, the Act provided
that a premarital agreement would be unenforceable only if it was
entered into involuntarily or if it was unconscionable at the time of
execution of the agreement and there was inadequate knowledge or
disclosure of the property of the other party.29 Only Louisiana and
Washington have not adopted the UPAA.30 Those states also
require premarital agreements to be in writing but have limitations
on what can be achieved through those agreements. Therefore,
when a married couple wishes to opt out of the community
property system, there are formal requirements to ensure their
views of their property will be respected.
28. See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (1983), adopted in
Arizona in 1991 (ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-201-5 (West, Westlaw current
through Apr. 2011 amendments)); California in 1985 (CAL. FAM. CODE §§
1600-17 (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011 amendments)); Idaho in
1995 (IDAHO CODE §§ 32-921-9 (West, Westlaw current through Jul. 2011
amendments)); Nevada in 1989 (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 123A.010-100 (West
2008)); New Mexico in 1995 (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3A-1-10 (West, Westlaw
current through Mar. 2011 amendments)); Texas in 1997 (TEX. FAM. CODE §§
4.001-.010 (West, Westlaw current through May 2011 amendments). Louisiana
and Washington did not adopt the UPAA. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2329-30
(2011); In re Marriage of Matson, 730 P.2d 668 (Wash. 1986); In re Marriage of
Bernard, 204 P.3d 907 (Wash. 2009).
29. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt. (1983) ("Subsection (b)
undergirds the freedom allowed the parties by making clear that the terms of the
agreement respecting maintenance and property are binding upon the court
unless those terms are found to be unconscionable." (quoting Commissioner's
Note, UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306)); see e.g. CAL. FAM. CODE §
1615 (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011 amendments).
30. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2329-30; Matson, 730 P.2d 668 (Wash. 1986);
Bernard, 204 P.3d 907 (Wash. 2009).
[Vol. 728
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The question then arises whether it is possible to opt out
informally, as through an oral agreement. It is possible, at least in
some instances, that an oral premarital agreement will be upheld,
though it is unusual."
However, in DewBerry v. George, the Washington Court of
Appeals did just that. Emanuel George and Carla DewBerry had
orally agreed before they married to treat their earned income as
separate property. This is the classic way to opt out of the major
precept of the community property system. During their nine-year
marriage, they acted in accord with their agreement, and this was
proved by clear and convincing evidence. When they were dating,
Carla had just graduated from Boalt Hall School of Law and was
working toward becoming a CPA. Emanuel was a college-
educated music industry executive. In 1981, the couple discussed
marriage. Emanuel had strong feelings about the community
property system because he had a friend who had lost his house in
a divorce settlement. He had specific demands regarding how to
structure their marriage, including that "each party's income and
property would be treated as separate property; each party would
own a home to return to if the marriage failed... . 32 The evidence
showed they "continually affirmed this agreement through words
and actions."33 They had separate bank accounts where they
deposited their incomes. They had used a joint account only to
handle agreed-upon household expenses after their first child was
born. By the time they separated in 2000, they had accumulated
minimal community property in the form of joint accounts and
jointly purchased possessions. On the other hand, they had many
investment, bank, and retirement accounts. Those accounts were
considered owned, managed, and controlled by the spouse who
created and contributed to the accounts. The beneficiaries of their
accounts were either their children or the estate of each spouse. In
addition, the houses that Carla purchased were treated as her
separate property, and Emanuel had indicated in writing that he
had no interest in the houses. Both Carla and Emanuel worked full-
time, but Carla's salary increased rapidly. By 2000, Carla's salary
was over $1 million, but Emanuel's salary had remained in the
$40,000 to $50,000 range. 34
31. Freitas v. Freitas, 159 P. 611, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1916); Hall v. Hall,
271 Cal. Rptr. 773, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); DewBerry v. George, 62 P.3d 525,
526 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
32. DewBerry, 62 P.3d at 526. He also had other conditions: that Carla
would always be fully employed and that Carla would not get fat. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 527.
9
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The trial court found the couple had a valid oral agreement and
that there had been complete performance of that agreement during
their marriage.3 5 Because Washington courts can distribute both
community and separate property equitably, the trial court awarded
Carla $2.3 million, or approximately 82% of their property.
Emanuel challenged the oral separate property agreement on
appeal, arguing it was "void under Washington's community
property law and the statute of frauds." 36 That argument was
rejected by the Court of Appeals because the "part performance
exception to the statute of frauds applied," and the agreement was
enforceable.3 7
One argument Emanuel made was that "Washington law
prohibits parties from entering into an agreement to repudiate the
community property system and that such an agreement is void
because it conflicts with public policy favoring creation of
community property."38 The Court of Appeals rejected the
argument as "not an accurate statement of Washington law."3 9 The
Court stated that "Washington courts have long held that a husband
and wife may contractually modify the status of their property."40
In addition, premarital agreements that opt out are encouraged
because they are "'generally regarded as conducive to marital
tranquility and the avoidance of disputes about property in the
future."' Thus, the Court of Appeals validated the practice of
opting out of the community property system via premarital
agreement, even by the informal method of an oral agreement fully
performed.
DewBerry shows the advantages and disadvantages of an
informal premarital agreement. Emanuel clearly wanted it both
ways. If the informal agreement benefited him, he would have
relied on it. If the informal agreement had not benefited him, he
could argue that it was void under community property law.
However, he did not take into account that Carla was both a law
graduate and a CPA. She understood that an oral agreement is
doubtful unless there is an exception to the statute of frauds and
that scrupulous records must be kept to show performance of the
agreement. The Court even noted that they were both well-
educated professionals who were aware of each other's
circumstances and had ample time to consider their financial
35. Id.
36. Id. at 528.




41. Id. (quoting Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (Wash. 1972)).
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arrangements during their five-year engagement and 14-year
marriage. Thus, opting out informally was upheld.
The equities of a particular situation may push a court in a
jurisdiction wedded to formal requirements, like California, to
recognize an oral premarital agreement. That was the situation in a
1990 California Court of Appeal case, Hall v. Hall.42 In that case,
an older couple was considering marriage. Carol hesitated to marry
Aubrey because she was concerned she would not have a place to
live for the rest of her life. Aubrey had asked Carol to give up her
job, apply for Social Security at age 62, and give him $10,000. In
return, he orally promised that she could live in his house until she
died. Pursuant to the agreement, they married. Carol fulfilled her
side of the agreement, and Aubrey took steps to fulfill his side by
having an attorney draft papers giving Carol a life estate in the
house. Unfortunately, Aubrey died before he signed the papers.
Aubrey's children from a former marriage challenged Carol's right
to stay in the house. Clearly, the formal writing requirements of
California law regarding a premarital agreement were not met. Yet
the trial court held that Carol's actions in reliance on Aubrey's
promise were sufficient to uphold their agreement under an
exception to the statute of frauds.43 The Court of Appeal affirmed,
illustrating that even in California where premarital agreements
must be in writing, there is still room to bend those formal rules to
recognize informal agreements where inequity would result.44
C. Option #3: Get Married and Informally Opt Out
If a couple marries, they automatically opt in to the community
property system. Although it may be a good idea, a pamphlet
explaining the community property regime is not usually handed
out with an application for a marriage license.45 If the couple has a
long and happy marriage, they are free to arrange their property as
they wish and can opt out of the sharing principles of community
property law. They have full autonomy to decide how to arrange
42. Hall v. Hall, 271 Cal. Rptr. 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
43. Id. at 778; See also Freitas v. Freitas, 159 P. 611, 612 (Cal. Ct. App.
1916) (upholding an oral agreement to make the wife the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy as a fully executed antenuptial agreement).
44. Id. at 779.
45. When California extended community property rights to registered
domestic partners, three separate notices were sent to all registered domestic
partners, advising them that if they did not dissolve their partnership before the
effective date of the Act, Jan. 1, 2005, all the rights and obligations of the
community property system would apply to them. CAL. CONTINUING EDUC. OF
THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS, §§ 1.16-.17 (2011).
11I
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their financial affairs. They may decide that one will work outside
the home and the other will stay at home and care for children and
be a homemaker. They can decide between themselves that all the
earnings of the working spouse are essentially owned and managed
by that spouse. Thus, they have informally opted out of sharing
principles of community property law. In essence, the community
property system intrudes on the financial affairs of a married
couple only if they are involved with the courts, either in a divorce
proceeding or when one of the couple dies.
1. Transmutation Requirements
However, the community property system does, at least,
attempt to intrude on the ability of the happily married couple to
make informal arrangements regarding their property. For instance,
California has stringent requirements for transmutation of property.
By statute, transmutation from community property to separate
property and vice versa must be "made in writing by an express
declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the
spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected." 46
Also, the requirements have been strictly construed to mean that
the spouse adversely affected must know he or she is giving up his
or her interest in the property.47 Thus, a married couple has the
ability to change the status of their property so long as they meet
these stringent requirements. However, these requirements have
led to surprising results for some couples, when written documents
intended to specify the character of property only at death were
applied at divorce.
In two recent California cases, In re Marriage of Holtemann48
and In re Marriage of Lund,49 the couples signed documents that
transmuted the husband's property from separate property to
community property. In Holtemann, the language used indicated a
transmutation: "Husband agrees that the character of the property
. . . is hereby transmuted from his separate property to the
community property of both parties."5 0 Similarly, in Lund, the
language used also indicated a transmutation: "All of the property
. . . is hereby converted to the community property of Husband and
Wife."5 The purpose of the documents in both cases was to
46. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments).
47. See In re Estate of MacDonald, 794 P.2d 911, 918-19 (Cal. 1990).
48. In re Marriage of Holtemann, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
49. In re Marriage of Lund, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
50. Holtemann, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 388.
51. Lund, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 89.
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provide favorable tax treatment in the event one of the spouses
died. The couples divorced, however, before that event occurred.
The husband in both cases argued that the transmutation should
apply only in the event of death and was not effective at divorce.
The California Courts of Appeal in both cases rejected the
argument. The Holtemann Court held transmutation cannot be
"conditional or temporary."5 2 Thus, a change in the character of the
property during marriage was ironclad. Compliance with stringent
statutory requirements resulted in a change that was certainly
unintended by the husbands in these cases. Therefore, formal
opting in to the community property system via transmutation
contradicted the informal intentions of the parties who followed
these directives.
The California transmutation statute allows an exception to the
stringent writing requirement for certain kinds of gifts including
diamond rings. The "express declaration in writing"s5 does not
apply to "a gift between the spouses of clothing, wearing apparel,
jewelry, or other tangible articles of a personal nature that is used
solely or principally by the spouse to whom the gift is made and
that is not substantial in value taking into account the
circumstances of the marriage." 54 In In re Marriage of
Steinberger," James and Buff purchased a loose diamond with
community funds. James later had it set in a ring and gave it to
Buff after their fifth anniversary with a card referring to the five
years and congratulating Buff on a promotion at work. Buff
testified at trial that it was a woman's ring and she wore it. James
testified that, "Ah, it was as a gift and as an investment, something
that we both could enjoy."5 6 He also testified that it was not his
intent to give her a five-year anniversary ring, and the most
expensive gift he had given during their marriage was a Christmas
gift that cost a few hundred dollars. The trial court found the
diamond ring was a gift and therefore was Buff's separate
property.
On appeal, James argued the ring remained community
property because there was no express declaration in writing to
show he had given up his interest in the ring. Specifically, he
argued one of the gift exception requirements had not been met:
"that [the gift] is not substantial in value taking into consideration
52. Holtemann, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 391.
53. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (West 2004, Westlaw current through Jan.
2011 amendments).
54. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(c) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments).
55. In re Marriage of Steinberger, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521(Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
56. Id. at 525.
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the circumstances of the marriage."57 Unfortunately for Buff, the
trial court found the ring was substantial in value considering the
circumstances of the marriage. Buff had testified that the ring was
worth at least $13,000 or $14,000, and the trial court stated "the
ring, or the stone, was of substantial value even taking into account
the circumstances of the marriage."58 The California Court of
Appeal agreed with James that the gift exception did not apply and
thus an express declaration was necessary. 59 The card that
accompanied the ring did not meet those requirements and the ring
remained community property. 60 On the other hand, if their
marriage had endured until James died, it is likely that their
informal arrangement regarding the diamond would have had the
opposite result. The ring would have been considered a gift to Buff
and, ultimately, her separate property.
The Court of Appeal recognized that the transmutation statute
"with its bright-line test regarding transmutations, may seem harsh
in light of the informal, everyday practices of spouses making gifts
during a marriage." 6' However, the Legislature, in enacting the
written transmutation requirements, had to balance the
convenience and practice of informal oral transmutations against
the danger of fraud and increased litigation at divorce regarding
those oral transmutations.62 The statute recognizes that ordinary
married couples should expect that formality is the norm regarding
personal property such as automobiles, bank accounts, and shares
of stock, but informality is the norm regarding personal property
gifts, such as jewelry, unless substantial in value.6 3 The Court of
Appeal stated that "[i]n light of the Legislature's decision and the
clear language of the statute, it would be inappropriate to hold that
a transmutation of jewelry that was substantial in value taking into
account the circumstances of the marriage occurred here without
the writing required by section 852.",64 Thus, the diamond ring was
community property, and the value should have been divided
equally at divorce. When it comes to gifts in California, formality
trumps informality.
57. Id. at 531.
58. Id. at 532 n.3.
59. Id. at 532.
60. Id. at 534.
61. Id. at 532-33.
62. Id. at 533.
63. Id. (citing Recommendation Relating to Marital Property Presumptions
and Transmutations, 17 CAL. L. REvIsION COMM'N REPORTS 205, 213-14
(1984), available at http://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Publ45.pdf).
64. Id.
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In Louisiana, the general principles of community property
control the characterization of gifts, including diamond rings. In
the case of Statham v. Statham,6 5 Jody and Butch Statham were
married in 1970 and divorced in 2005. According to a hearing
officer conference report, a diamond ring valued at about $17,000
and acquired during marriage was probably a birthday present to
Jody and, thus, her separate property. At trial, Jody testified that
the ring was purchased for more than $15,000 and given to her as a
birthday present. The ring was purchased two days before her
birthday in 2002, and her husband had said previously that they
should get her a ring for her birthday when they were joking about
their daughter-in-law's engagement ring being larger than hers.
Jody also admitted that the ring was bought at about the same time
they received money back from a cancer policy after Butch's bout
with cancer. Butch testified that, after they received that money,
they each got an expensive item-she got the ring and he got a
four-wheeler. According to Butch, his birthday gift to Jody was a
portrait of their son which was placed on a billboard. The trial
court found the ring was community property.
The trial court and the Louisiana Circuit Court of Appeal used
traditional community property principles to determine the
character of the ring. Property in possession of a spouse during
marriage is presumed to be community property, but either spouse
may prove that it is separate property.66 The spouse seeking to
rebut the presumption bears the burden of proving it is separate
property. Great deference is given to the trier of fact, "because
only the trier of fact can be aware of the variations in demeanor
and tone of voice that bear on" the credibility of witnesses.67 In
their testimony, the husband and wife "diametrically contradicted
each other on the subject of the ring."68 Because the trial court
found both sides equally credible, Jody failed to carry her burden
of rebutting the community property presumption. Thus, the trial
court's finding that the ring was community property was upheld.
Traditional community property principles were able to sort out the
dispute at divorce about the ring.
The result was the same in both Steinberger and Statham. A
valuable ring given to the wife did not become her separate
property. In both cases, the wives considered the diamond ring a
gift. This would not be unusual considering that in one case, it was
given at the time of their wedding anniversary, and in the other, it
65. Statham v. Statham, 986 So. 2d 894 (La. Ct. App. 2008).





was given at the time of the wife's birthday. However, the
substantial value of the rings, both worth over $10,000, demanded
more proof that both husband and wife intended the informal
action to be a transmutation from community property to separate
property. We can conclude that the informal interaction of giving a
ring may not hold up in the event of a divorce when the
community property regime must determine how to characterize
and divide the couple's acquisition during marriage.
2. Fiduciary Duty
Although California has codified the concept of "equal"
management and control of community property, California's
Family Code mandates that a spouse has a fiduciary duty to act in
good faith with respect to the other s ouse in the management and
control of the community property. Although the Code provides
that a spouse can sue the other spouse for breach of the fiduciary
duty even during marriage, 70 it is doubtful the marriage would
survive such a lawsuit. The Code does recognize that some spousal
transactions regarding community property must be formal and
others may be informal. For instance, if a spouse makes a gift of
community personal property to a person outside of the marriage,
that gift is subject to the written consent of the other spouse.n7 The
Code also requires that spouses must "join in executing any
instrument" in which community real property is sold, conveyed,
or encumbered.72 An example of informality is that a spouse who
manages a community business is given "primary" management
and control and may act alone in all transactions.7
69. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(e) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments); CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments).
70. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments) ("A spouse has a claim against the other spouse for any breach of
the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse's present
undivided one-half interest in the community estate. . . ."); CAL. FAM. CODE §
1101(b) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011 amendments) ("A court may
order an accounting of the property and obligations of the parties to a marriage
. .. . "); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(c) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments) ("A court may order that the name of a spouse shall be added to
community property held in the name of the other spouse alone ... ).
71. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(b) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments).
72. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102(a) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments).
73. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(d) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments). However, the managing spouse must give "prior written notice to
the other spouse" of major actions such as "sale, lease, exchange, encumbrance,
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However, the general spousal fiduciary duty to "act in good
faith" regarding community property continues throughout the
marriage and extends until the "date of the distribution of the
community or quasi-community asset or liability in question." 74
Therefore, the fiduciary duty commences upon marriage and
continues until the couple's property is divided. During divorce
proceedings, the spouses are subject to a "temporary restraining
order" that restrains "both parties from transferring, encumbering,
hypothecating, concealing, or in any way disposing of any
property, real or personal, whether community, quasi-community,
or separate, without the written consent of the other party or an
",75order of the court...
The essence of the fiduciary duty is that one spouse should not
"take any unfair advantage of the other."76 Too many married
people, once separated from their spouse, no longer feel bound by
the community property system and sometimes violate their
fiduciary duty. California law does recognize that earnings during
separation are the separate property of the earning spouse.
However, separate property is included in the temporary
restraining order that prohibits disposing of that property unless the
other spouse gives written consent or the court orders it.
Accordingly, spouses who have thought that "separation" is
equivalent to "opting out" of the community property system have
been profoundly mistaken.
Concealment of community property funds is considered a
breach of the fiduciary duty. In In re Marriage of Rossi,78 shortly
before the wife, Denise, filed a petition for dissolution of her
marriage to her husband Thomas, she became part of a lottery pool
at work. The pool won, and Denise's share totaled more than $1.3
million. She never revealed that she had won to Thomas, nor did
or other disposition of all or substantially all of the personal property used in the
operation of the business." Id.
74. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102(a) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments).
75. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2040(a) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments). There are exceptions for the "usual course of business" or for the
"necessities of life." However, the temporary restraining order does not preclude
use of property to pay reasonable attorney's fees. Id.
76. CAL. FAM. CODE §721(b) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments).
77. CAL. FAM. CODE §771(a) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments) ("The earnings and accumulations of a spouse . . . while living
separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the
spouse.").
78. In re Marriage of Rossi, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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she include it in the required disclosure of assets during the
dissolution proceedings. Two years after the divorce, Thomas
found out about the lottery winnings. He sought an award of all the
winnings based on California Family Code § 1101(h), which states
that the remedy for breach of fiduciary duty involving fraud "shall
include . .. an award to the other spouse of 100 percent ... of any
asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty."
It was clear that Denise had gone to great lengths to conceal from
Thomas the winnings that were community property. Thus,
because Denise's actions involved fraud, the California Court of
Appeal upheld the trial court's award of the lottery winnings to
Thomas.8 Thus, Denise's attempt to opt out of sharing community
property had dire results.
In a high-profile California case, In re Marriage of
McTiernan,8 1 John McTiernan violated the temporary restraining
order that was in effect during divorce proceedings. Apparently, he
thought he could deal with community property stocks under the
"equal" management and control provisions of California law. In
fact, he used the proceeds to pay community expenses. However,
the stock's market price had increased substantially by the time of
trial. The trial court awarded wife Donna Dubrow one-half of the
lost profits. The Court of Appeal rejected John's arguments that his
actions were either an exception to the prohibitions in the
temporary restraining order or just a technical violation.82 Instead
the Court viewed the violation as equivalent to a nonmalicious
breach of fiduciary duty, where the remedy is an award of 50% of
any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of that duty.
Obviously, John had thought that he was not subject to the
community property laws once he had separated from Donna and
entered into divorce proceedings. In short, after marriage, it is not
possible to completely opt out until community property is finally
divided at divorce.
79. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(h) (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 2011
amendments).
80. Rossi, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278.
81. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
82. Id. at 297.
83. Id. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(g) (West, Westlaw current through
Jan. 2011 amendments) ("Remedies for breach of the fiduciary duty .. . shall
include . . . an award to the other spouse of 50 percent . . . of any asset
undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty. . . .")).
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II. CONCLUSION
Although autonomy is a value treasured in American society,
the community property regime may intrude on that autonomy
whether a couple is married or unmarried. Formal "opting out," as
in the case of written premarital agreements, provides the most
certain way to assert a couple's independence from the sharing
concepts of community property laws. Informal methods of
"opting out," either through oral premarital agreements or
unwritten financial arrangements, will meet varying degrees of
success. In a long and stable marriage, it can be assumed that the
couple has informally worked out the mechanics of sharing or not
sharing to their satisfaction. When the unfortunate event of divorce
occurs, couples may try to assert their view of the property
accumulated during the marriage. However, assuring that couples
deal fairly with each other regarding the property accumulated
during the marriage becomes the paramount role for the courts.
The question remains whether other community property states
will follow California's lead in legislatively mandating formal
requirements regarding many areas of spousal autonomy.
California's requirements regarding transmutation and fiduciary
duty are examples of guidelines on how courts should deal with
spouses' attempts to opt in or opt out of the community property
system. Washington courts have great discretion to deal with
informal arrangements of couples, in extending some community
property rights to those in a marital-like relationship and in
recognizing that an oral premarital agreement may be upheld.
Louisiana courts stick to the basic principles of characterizing
property that are claimed to be intraspousal gifts. The California
view tends to treat spouses more like business partners where their
financial arrangements are formal and in writing. The other states
considered in this essay remain committed to recognizing the
informality of many married couples' arrangements and attempt a
case-by-case analysis to determine how to fulfill spousal
expectations regarding their property.
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